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 Affect suppression (AS) is an emotion regulation strategy that is known to be 
associated with temporary depletion of executive functioning. The purpose of this study 
was to examine the ramification of this effect on clinical neuropsychological evaluations, 
as well as whether this effect generalizes to working memory and processing speed. 
Fifty-six adults (mean age 22.89) completed the Burden of State Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire (measuring AS burden generally vs. on the day of testing), subtests from 
the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System, and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
III Working Memory and Processing Speed subtests. Individuals with high AS burden on 
the day of testing exhibited poorer executive performance, but only when their general 
AS burden was low.   The magnitude of this effect was clinically significant (i.e., 2/3 of 
SD).  This effect held even after accounting of demographics, depression levels, 
processing speed, and working memory.  AS did not account for variance in working 
memory or processing speed performances above and beyond executive functioning.  
These results suggest that AS burden on the day of testing has deleterious effects on 
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In clinical neuropsychology, an important area of research is the continuing 
removal of systematic test-performance variance unrelated to neuropathology (Suchy, 
2011).  Although the field has become quite advanced in terms of accounting for 
demographically related variance (e.g., Advanced Clinical Solutions for the WAIS-IV 
and WMS-IV (Pearson Clinical Assessments, 2009)), a variety of situational factors also 
have systematic and measurable effects on cognitive test performance.  For example, 
recent caffeine and carbohydrate intake (Maridakis, Herring, & O’Connor, 2009; 
Maridakis, O’Connor, & Tomporowski, 2009), sleep quality (Harrison & Horne, 2000), 
and time of day (Allen, Grabbe, McCarthy, Bush, & Wallace, 2008; Bennett, Petros, 
Johnson, & Ferraro, 2008) may all affect basic attention and executive functions in non-
patient samples. Additionally, some situational factors can impact emotional states, 
which can also systematically affect performance.  Some evidence suggests that induced 
dysphoric and euphoric moods correspond with better performance on right- and left-
hemisphere dominant tasks, respectively (Bartolic, Basso, Schefft, Glauser, & Titanic-
Schefft, 1999); that participants are more distracted by mood-congruent than by mood-
incongruent stimuli (Gilboa-Schechtman, Revelle, & Gotlib, 2000); and that induced 
positive mood may be associated with temporarily poorer working memory (Martin & 
Kerns, 2011) and executive functioning (Oaksford, Morris, Grainger, & Williams, 1996). 




Together, these findings support the value of taking situational factors into account when 
interpreting performance on standardized neuropsychological tests.  However, there are 
currently no standard procedures for taking situational factors into account, in part due to 
scarcity of research on their specific impact on clinical evaluations, and in part due to the 
lack of assessment procedures that would adequately quantify them. 
One situational factor that appears to affect cognition and has received increasing 
attention from researchers is engagement in affect suppression (AS).  AS is an emotion 
regulation strategy characterized by effortful control of facial affect and other automatic 
emotional responses, such as laughter or crying (Gross, 1998). The need to transiently 
engage in AS is ubiquitous in human society, and context-appropriate use of AS is 
associated with positive interpersonal functioning (Gross, 2007).  However, chronic or 
prolonged AS has been shown to have deleterious consequences.  Physiologically, AS is 
an ineffective strategy for eliminating emotional arousal, and may even increase, rather 
than dampen, amygdalar and autonomic activation associated with emotional experiences 
(Ohira et al., 2006). Thus, preferential use of AS over other emotion regulation strategies 
(e.g., cognitive reappraisal) is associated with negative emotional and physical health 
outcomes (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010; Denollet, Martens, Nyklíček, 
Conraads, & de Gelder, 2008; Moore, Zoellner, & Mollenholt, 2008; Myers et al., 2008).  
A growing body of research suggests that engagement in AS also has deleterious effects 
on executive functioning. 
The deleterious effect of AS on cognition has been studied primarily within the 
realm of social psychology, where it is generally referred to as the “depletion of self-
control” abilities (Baumeister, 2002).   Specifically, the social literature associates AS 




with measurable decrements in subsequent executive functioning, and vice versa. 
Compared to controls, individuals who engage in acts of self-regulation tend to 
subsequently exhibit more behavioral dyscontrol, including poorer physical stamina (i.e., 
handgrip strength) and higher rates of impulsive spending, breaking diets, aggressive 
responses, and willingness to engage in inappropriate sexual behaviors (Baumeister & 
Alquist, 2009; Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Muraven, Tice, & 
Baumeister, 1998).  Participants depleted by self-regulatory acts are also more likely to 
be persuaded by weak arguments (Baumeister & Alquist, 2009), use simpler, more error-
prone heuristics, and postpone decision-making (Pocheptsova, Amir, Dhar, & 
Baumeister, 2009). Cognitively, participants directed to regulate their response to an 
emotional stimulus or to engage in a cognitively-demanding executive task show poorer 
performance relative to controls on subsequent measures of logic and reasoning, 
cognitive extrapolation, response inhibition, and working memory (Inzlicht & Gutsell, 
2007; Schmeichel, 2007; Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003).  Furthermore, targets 
of stereotype threat who spontaneously regulate the appearance of anxiety in response to 
threat priming perform more poorly on subsequent cognitive tests than do their non-
suppressing peers (Johns, Inzlicht, & Schmader, 2008), suggesting that naturally-
occurring AS may also be associated with cognitive underperformance in the near-term.  
Importantly, depletion is not instantly resolved with the removal of a taxing demand, but 
temporarily eliminates resources needed to respond optimally to subsequent demands for 
an indeterminate period (Baumeister, 2002b; Gailliot, 2010; Pocheptsova et al., 2009; 
Schmeichel et al., 2003; Stucke & Baumeister, 2006). 
The mutually depleting effect between executive functioning and engagement in 




AS can likely be explained by conceptualizing AS itself as an executive ability.  By 
definition, AS requires both cognitive and behavioral control (abilities falling under the 
umbrella of executive functioning).  Similar to executive functioning, AS is highly 
effortful (Gailliot, 2010); it involves controlling emotional reactions while already 
physiologically aroused (Gross & Levenson, 1993). In addition to the conceptual overlap 
between AS and executive functioning, neuroimaging evidence supports common 
neuroanatomic networks underlying both processes (i.e., dorsolateral, orbitofrontal, 
ventromedial, and anterior cingulate cortices) (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; 
Beer & Lombardo, 2007; Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2008; Ochsner & Gross, 
2007; Spinella, 2007; Suchy, 2011).  
Although the depleting relationship between AS and executive functioning has 
been consistently replicated in the social literature, it is unclear whether this effect 
represents a clinically relevant confound for neuropsychology, or whether it is too 
fleeting and negligible to have a meaningful impact on test performance.  In other words, 
while the existing research base provides solid support for the depletion effect 
experimentally, translation of that effect into clinical neuropsychological practice 
requires a different approach. For instance, much of the existing research on the depletion 
effect shows that AS deleteriously affects performance on tasks related to, but not 
necessarily synonymous with, executive functioning.  Some studies measure the effect of 
AS on behaviors in which executive abilities are implicated (i.e., suppressing aggressive 
responses to insults, resisting tempting foods, and persistence on difficult puzzles) 
without providing evidence of an underlying cognitive depletion (Baumeister, 2002a; 
Baumeister & Alquist, 2009; Baumeister, Gailliot, DeWall, & Oaten, 2006; Gailliot, 




2010). Others have measured the effect of AS on working memory (e.g., the Operation 
Span task, reverse digit span) (Schmeichel, 2007) or deductive and inductive reasoning 
tasks (e.g., logic problems from standardized testing such as the GRE and the CET, 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices, etc.) (Schmeichel et al., 2003; Shamosh & Gray, 2007). 
The few published studies measuring the effect of AS on a commonly accepted clinical 
measure of executive functioning have relied on a single measure as their outcome 
variable, such as the Stroop test (Inzlicht & Gutsell, 2007; Johns et al., 2008; Richeson, 
Trawalter, & Shelton, 2005).  However, due to the hierarchical structure of cognition 
(Stuss, Picton, & Alexander, 2001), any single measure of executive functioning 
necessarily relies on a number of component processes (e.g., the Stroop test has visual-
perceptual and processing speed components).  Thus, when using a single measure, it is 
unclear whether an observed performance decrement is due to an effect on executive 
functions or an effect on one or more component processes.    
The second reason for not understanding the clinical significance of the depletion 
effect is that the effect has not been directly demonstrated with naturally occuring AS.  
The majority of the existing research has experimentally manipulated AS by prohibiting 
participants from expressing their emotions while viewing disturbing images, being 
exposed to experimenter provocation, or being exposed to tempting stimuli (Baumeister 
et al., 1998; Inzlicht & Gutsell, 2007; Johns et al., 2008; Richeson et al., 2005; 
Schmeichel, 2007; Schmeichel et al., 2003; Shamosh & Gray, 2007; Stucke & 
Baumeister, 2006). While this methodology provides a well-controlled manipulation of 
AS, it does not tap into real-world AS as experienced in daily life, and therefore does not 
address whether everyday AS influences the results of clinical evaluations.  




Purpose of the Current Study 
The purpose of the current study was to demonstrate that certain situational 
factors (such as the depleting effect of AS) can be quantified, and that their impact on 
neuropsychological test performance can be accounted for (Suchy, 2011).  To that end, 
we examined whether the depletion effect between AS and executive functioning 
demonstrated in the social literature is clinically relevant in neuropsychological 
evaluations.  We had two specific aims: (1) to reproduce the depletion effect using 
standardized clinical measures of executive functioning and naturally-occurring AS 
assessed via self-report, and (2) to determine whether the effect is specific to executive 
functioning or whether it applies to related cognitive abilities confounded with executive 
functioning in previous studies (i.e., working memory and processing speed). To those 
ends, we administered a self-report measure of state AS along with a battery of cognitive 
tests, including measures of executive functioning, working memory, and processing 
speed, to a sample of young adults. We hypothesized that higher self-reported burden of 
state AS would account for variance in executive performance above and beyond known-







 Participants were 56 undergraduate volunteers enrolled in psychology courses at 
the University of Utah, who participated in exchange for credit. Depression was an 
exclusion criterion, since chronic low mood has known negative effects on executive 
performance (McDermott & Ebmeier, 2009) and would likely also be related to level of 
AS, thus presenting a confound in the relationship between our variables of interest.  
Participants were mostly female (64.3%), White/Caucasian (66.1%), and right-handed 
(87.5%). Their mean age was 22.89 years (18-37 years, sd = 4.986), and they were in 
their junior year of college on average (mean 14 years of education completed, 11-17 
years, sd = 1.379).   
 
Procedures 
After undergoing informed consent procedures, participants completed a 3-hour 
long neuropsychological testing battery one-on-one with an examiner in the 
Neuropsychology Laboratory in the Social and Behavioral Sciences building on the 
University of Utah campus.  The battery included measures designed to assess (a) the 
burden of AS, (b) executive functioning, (c) working memory, (d) processing speed, and 
(e) an estimate of crystallized intelligence  as a measure of discriminant validity (since 




crystallized intelligence is considered to be separable from executive functioning abilities 
and therefore should be unrelated to AS).  We used raw scores for all analyses. All 
procedures were in compliance with institutional and international standards for research 
with human participants (in compliance with the University of Utah IRB and the Helsinki 
Declaration). 
 Burden of affect suppression. The Burden of State Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire (B-SERQ) was developed by the researchers as a measure of the burden of 
AS. The measure includes 15 questions regarding level of effort involved in acts of 
suppression that are asked twice, as they apply (1) over the past 2 weeks (baseline score)
1
 
and (2) over the past 24 hours (state score). Seven items ask about suppression of 
negative affect, four ask about suppression of positive affect, and four ask about valence-
neutral AS (interpretable as suppression of either positive or negative affect). Items are 
scored on a 4-point scale, from “never” to “all the time.” The subscales used in principle 
analyses include items found to contribute to internal consistency in this sample (see 
Results). 
Executive functioning. The Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System battery (D-
KEFS) (Delis, Kramer, Kaplan, & Holdnack, 2004) is a well-validated, widely used 
battery of executive measures.  As we have done in prior research (Kraybill & Suchy, 
2011; Kraybill, Thorgusen, & Suchy, 2012; Williams, Suchy, & Kraybill, 2010), we 
combined a subset of the D-KEFS subtests into a single composite of executive 
                                                          
1
 Because there are no accepted standards for determining high, average, and low burden of self-reported 
state AS, we included a baseline score in order to compare this with the burden on the day of testing. We 
were then able to determine whether absolute level of state burden, absolute level of baseline burden, the 
difference between the two (essentially using the baseline score as the normative standard), or all three 
measures would account for significant variance in executive functioning. 




functioning. Creating a composite of several measures allows the variance accounted for 
by some of the component processes to cancel out (as different tasks require somewhat 
different component processes), while the variance that is shared by all three tasks (i.e., 
executive functioning) remains.  The following tasks were used: Trail Making Test 
(Letter Number Sequencing Condition), Design Fluency, and Color-Word Interference 
(Inhibition Condition).  Using factor analysis, the raw scores of these three subtests were 
combined into an executive functioning composite score (Cronbach’s alpha = .535).  
Working memory. The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III (WAIS-III) 
Working Memory Index (WMI) is a widely accepted, highly reliable measure of the 
ability to hold in mind and manipulate information for a short period of time (Wechsler, 
1997a).  The following subtests were included in the composite: Digit Span, Arithmetic, 
and Letter Number Sequencing. Using factor analysis, the raw scores from these three 
subtests were combined into a single composite score (Cronbach’s alpha = .790).  
Processing speed. The WAIS-III Processing Speed Index (PSI) is a widely 
accepted measure of motor, perceptual, and mental speed that features excellent 
reliability (Wechsler, 1997a). Coding and Symbol Search subtests were included in the 
composite. Using factor analysis, the raw scores from these subtests were combined into 
a single composite score (Cronbach’s alpha = .727). 
Discriminant validity. Participants also completed the Wechsler Test of Adult 
Reading (WTAR) (PsychCorp, 2001), a widely used, highly reliable estimate of verbal 
IQ.  This knowledge-based, nonexecutive measure of verbal intelligence allowed for 
examination of discriminant validity; performance on this task was expected to show no 
relationship with AS as measured by the B-SERQ.   




Depression. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II), a highly reliable screening 
measure for depression (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961), was 







Preliminary Analyses  
B-SERQ item selection. We computed Cronbach’s alpha, examining B-SERQ 
state and baseline items separately (15 items each), and eliminated non-
contributing/detracting items in a stepwise fashion until a set of only contributing items 
was identified.  A set of 13 baseline items met this criterion and displayed excellent 
internal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .811). These items tap inhibition of negative 
affect (n= 7), positive affect (n= 2), and generalized AS (n= 4) (see Table 1). For state 
AS, 11 items all contributed to good internal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .795), 
including regulation of negative (n= 4), positive (n= 2), and generalized AS (n= 5) (see 




Zero order correlations. Zero order correlations between state and baseline AS  
and cognitive variables (executive functioning, working memory, processing speed, and 
crystalized intelligence) showed a significant moderate relationship between executive 
functioning and working memory, processing speed, crystalized intelligence, and state 
AS. Working memory, processing speed, and crystalized intelligence were not related to 
either state or baseline AS (see Table 3). 
                                                          
2
 Additional findings on psychometric properties and construct validation of the B-SERQ will be reported 
elsewhere. 




 Aim 1: AS variance in executive functioning. To examine whether self-reported 
AS accounted for variance in executive functioning performance, we conducted a 
hierarchical regression with the executive composite score as the criterion and with age, 
years of education, and sex as predictors on Step 1 to control for demographic factors 
related to cognitive performance. Baseline and state AS scores were entered on Steps 2 
and 3, respectively, to allow for examination of the contribution of state AS above and 
beyond participants’ typical (or baseline) AS burden.  Lastly, the interaction term (i.e., 
between baseline and state AS) was entered on Step 4 to account for the possible 
interaction between baseline level and state AS on the day of testing.  Results are 
presented in Table 4 (Model 1). As can be seen in the table, the interaction significantly 
predicted executive performance, contributing 15.4% of variance above and beyond 
previous steps.  
 Considering the significant correlations among cognitive composites (Table 3), 
and in order to examine whether AS would continue to predict executive functioning 
performance after accounting for component processes, we repeated the hierarchical 
regression with working memory and processing speed composites added as predictors. 
Results are presented in Table 4 (Model 2).  As can be seen in the table, while working 
memory and processing speed added significant variance to the prediction of executive 
functioning (36% collectively) above and beyond demographics, the AS interaction 
continued to contribute significantly above and beyond all previous steps (accounting for 
7.1% of variance).  
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In order to interpret the interaction between state and baseline AS, we conducted a 
series of simple slopes analyses. As recommended by Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken 
(2003), we repeated the hierarchical regression (Model 2) centering baseline and state AS 
in turn at the median, one standard deviation below the median, and one standard 
deviation above the median. We used medians rather than means because state AS was 
positively skewed [skewness = 1.25]. Summaries of coefficients for the simple effects of 
state and baseline AS in these regressions are presented in Table 5. As can be seen in the 
table, all levels of state AS predicted executive functioning when baseline AS was low, 
but state AS was unrelated to executive functioning when baseline AS was centered at the 
median or high.  In other words, state AS had a measureable impact on executive 
performance only for individuals who reported their baseline AS burden to be low. 
To illustrate this interaction, we divided the sample into four groups based on the 
results of the simple slopes analyses. For state AS, we used median split to divide the 
sample into high (n= 29) and low (n= 27) state-AS groups.  For baseline AS, we used a 
cutting point just below the median (separating individuals who were below the median 
from those who were at or above the median, per simple slopes results), again creating 
high (n=34) and low (n=22) baseline-AS groups. The resulting four AS groups included 
23 participants reporting high burden on both state and baseline AS, 16 reporting low 
burden on both state and at baseline, 11 reporting low burden on state but high burden at 
baseline, and 6 reporting high burden on state and low burden at baseline. We generated 
estimated marginal mean executive composite scores for each group (correcting for age, 
education, sex, working memory, and processing speed) and graphed the results (see 
Figure 1). As can be seen in the figure, the highest (i.e., best) scores were produced by 
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participants reporting low burden on both state and baseline AS, while the poorest scores 
were observed for those reporting low AS burden at baseline but high burden of state AS. 
Participants who were high or average at baseline exhibited an intermediate range of 
scores on the executive composite, regardless of their state levels.  
To illustrate the clinical significance of these findings, we generated mean 
executive scaled scores (averaging the three subtests included in the composite) and 
graphed the results (see Figure 2).  As can be seen in the figure, participants reporting 
low burden for baseline AS but high burden for state AS scored on average over 2/3 of a 
standard deviation (i.e., 2 scale scores) below those whose AS burdens were low at both 
baseline and state. 
Aim 2: Affect suppression predicting component cognitive processes. In order 
to determine whether the depleting effect of AS is specific to executive functioning or 
whether it also applies to working memory and processing speed, we repeated the 
hierarchical regressions above with working memory and processing speed composite 
scores as the criterion variables. Results for working memory and processing speed are 
summarized in Tables 6 and 7, respectively. As can be seen in Table 6, the AS interaction 
contributed significant variance to the prediction of working memory performance.  
However, when executive functioning was added to the model, AS variables no longer 
contributed unique variance (see Model 2), suggesting that it was the executive demands 
of the task that were responsible for the relationship between AS and working memory.  
With respect to processing speed, only the executive functioning composite contributed 
significant variance to the model (19.4% above and beyond previous steps), while all AS 
variables remained nonsignificant in both models (see Table 7). 




 To examine whether AS significantly predicted crystalized intelligence (as a 
measure of discriminant validity with minimal executive demands), we ran a hierarchical 
regression predicting WTAR raw score with demographics (age, education, and sex), 
baseline AS, state AS, and the interaction between the two AS scores entered on separate 
steps. As expected, AS did not contribute significantly to the model (p>.05). 
 
Supplementary Analyses 
 Subclinical depression and the depletion effect. In order to ensure that the 
depleting effect of state AS in participants with low baseline AS was not attributable to 
the effects of subclinical depression in our sample, we repeated the Aim 1 hierarchical 
regression with depression (i.e., BDI-II total score) added as a predictor on Step 2. While 
depression contributed nonsignificantly to the prediction of executive functioning (p= 
.078), both state AS (Fchange (1, 48) = 4.409, p= .041; R
2
change = .078) and the interaction 
(Fchange (1, 47) = 9.223, p= .004; R
2
change = .139) added significant variance to prediction 
of executive functioning above and beyond previous steps. 




Table 1. Baseline Affect Suppression: Final Items 
 











Item (Valence) Corrected Item-Total Correlation  
1. I have made sure not to show my 
positive emotions. (P) 
.325 
2. I have made sure not to show my 
negative emotions. (N) 
.449 
3. I have worked hard to smile back at 
others. (N) 
.459 
4. I have forced myself to respond 
positively. (N) 
.548 
5. It has been difficult to maintain a 
neutral/pleasant facial expression. (G) 
.486 
6. It has been difficult to maintain an even 
tone of voice. (G) 
.418 
7. I have fought to hold back tears. (N) .372 
8. I have worked hard not to say what I 
was really thinking. (G) 
.313 
9. I have remained silent in order to keep 
myself from an angry outburst, or from 
saying something I didn’t mean. (N) 
.686 
10. I have worked hard to control, for 
example, impulses to throw or hit 
things. (N) 
.277 
11. I have had to work hard to 
control/moderate my breathing. (G) 
.553 
12. I have worked hard not to show I was 
scared. (N) 
.632 
It has been difficult not to blurt out                                 
something I was excited about (where it 
was inappropriate or interrupted 
someone else). (P) 
.357 
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Table 2. State Affect Suppression: Final Items 
 









Item (Valence) Corrected Item-Total Correlation  
1. I have made sure not to show my 
positive emotions. (P) 
.503 
2. I have made sure not to show my 
negative emotions. (N) 
.549 
4. I have forced myself to respond 
positively. (N) 
.476 
5. It has been difficult to maintain a 
neutral/pleasant facial expression. (G) 
.544 
6. It has been difficult to maintain an even 
tone of voice. (G) 
.450 
8. I have worked hard not to say what I 
was really thinking. (G) 
.383 
9. I have remained silent in order to keep 
myself from an angry outburst, or from 
saying something I didn’t mean. (N) 
.567 
11. I have had to work hard to 
control/moderate my breathing. (G) 
.408 
12. I have worked hard not to show I was 
scared. (N) 
.385 
14. I have worked hard not to make an 
inappropriate joke or comment. (G) 
.508 
15. It has been difficult not to blurt out 
something I was excited about (where it 
was inappropriate or interrupted 
someone else). (P) 
.369 
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Table 3. Zero Order Correlations Among Affect Suppression and Cognitive Domains 
 
Note. State AS = affect suppression over the past 24 hours; Baseline AS = affect 
suppression over the past 2 weeks; Executive Functioning = D-KEFS subtest composite 
score; Working Memory = WAIS working memory subtest composite score; Processing 





































State AS - .293* - .195 - .174 - .161 
Baseline AS - .230 - .199 - .197 - .048 
Executive 
Functioning 
 .515** .434** .432** 
Working Memory   .290* .453** 
Processing Speed    .140 
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Note. State AS = affect suppression over the past 24 hours; Baseline AS = affect 
suppression over the past 2 weeks; Interaction = State AS x Baseline AS; Working 
Memory = WAIS working memory subtest composite score; Processing Speed = WAIS 











Step Predictor R² Adjusted 
R² 
R² ∆ F ∆ df p value 
Model 
1 
       
1 Age, Sex, 
Education 
.001 -.058 .001 .015 3, 51 .997 
2 Baseline AS .054 -.021 .054 2.830 1, 50 .099 
3 State AS .095 .003 .041 2.224 1, 49 .142 
4 Interaction .249 .156 .154 9.839 1, 48 .003** 
Model 
2 





.361 .296 .360 13.822 2, 49 .000** 
3 Baseline AS .369 .290 .008 .607 1, 48 .440 
4 State AS .386 .295 .017 1.283 1, 47 .263 
5 Interaction .457 .362 .071 5.979 1, 46 .018* 
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Table 5. Simple Slopes Coefficients 
 
Note. Baseline Average = Baseline AS centered at the median; Baseline Low = Baseline 
AS centered one standard deviation below the median; Baseline High = Baseline AS 
centered one standard deviation above the median; State Average = State AS centered at 
the median; State Low = State AS centered one standard deviation below the median; 
State High = State AS centered one standard deviation above the median; ** p<.01 (two-









AS Centering β Std. Error t p value 
Baseline Average 
State Average 
-.008 .017 -.479 .634 
-.042 .022 -1.944 .058 
Baseline High .020 .018 1.070 .290 
State High -.008 .022 -.376 .709 
Baseline Low -.036 .022 -1.633 .109 
State Low -.077 .030 -2.588 .013* 
Baseline Average .020 .018 1.070 .290 
State High -.042 .022 -1.944 .058 
Baseline Average -.036 .022 -1.633 .109 
State Low -.042 .022 -1.944 .058 
Baseline High -.008 .017 -.479 .634 
State Average -.008 .022 -.376 .709 
Baseline Low -.008 .017 -.479 .634 
State Average -.077 .030 -2.588 .013* 
Baseline Low .020 .018 1.070 .290 
State High -.077 .030 -2.588 .013* 
Baseline High -.036 .022 -1.633 .109 
State Low -.008 .022 -.376 .709 





Figure 1.  The figure illustrates the interaction between state (past 24 hours) and baseline 
(past 2 weeks) burden of affective suppression (AS).  As can be seen from the figure, 
only individuals with low baseline burden of AS were deleteriously affected by high state 
burden of AS. In contrast, individuals with high baseline AS exhibit somewhat lower 
levels of executive functioning,  regardless of their state AS burden. 
Executive functioning composite scores is a factor score of three subtests from the 
D-KEFS subtests.   ). Low State = State AS scores below the median; High State = State 
AS scores above the median; Low Baseline = Baseline AS scores just below the median 
and lower; High Baseline = Baseline AS scores at the median and above. Higher 









































Figure 2. The figure illustrates the clinical significance of the interaction between state 
(past 24 hours) and baseline (past 2 weeks) burden of affective suppression (AS).  
Among individuals with low baseline AS, those who were high on the day of testing 
performed approximately 2/3 of a standard deviation below those who continued to be 
low on the day of testing. In contrast, individuals with high baseline AS exhibited a 
similar level of executive performance  regardless of their state AS burden. 
Mean executive functioning scaled scores (i.e., D-KEFS subtests) by baseline AS 
(affect suppression over the past 2 weeks) and state AS (affect suppression over the past 
24 hours). Low State = State AS scores below the median; High State = State AS scores 
above the median; Low Baseline = Baseline AS scores just below the median and lower; 
High Baseline = Baseline AS scores at the median and above. Higher scaled scores 
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Table 6. Predicting Working Memory 
 
Note. State AS = affect suppression over the past 24 hours; Baseline AS = affect 
suppression over the past 2 weeks; Interaction = State AS x Baseline AS; Executive 













Step Predictor R² Adjusted 
R² 
R² ∆ F ∆ df p value 
Model 
1 
       
1 Age, Sex, 
Education 
.026 -.031 .026 .457 3, 52 .713 
2 Baseline AS .063 -.010 .038 2.045 1, 51 .159 
3 State AS .074 -.018 .011 .587 1, 50 .447 
4 Interaction .193 .094 .119 7.204 1, 49 .010* 
Model 
2 
       
2 Executive 
Functioning 
.287 .230 .261 18.283 1, 50 .000** 
3 Baseline AS .293 .221 .006 .411 1, 49 .524 
4 State AS .293 .204 .000 .002 1, 48 .969 
6 Interaction .321 .219 .028 1.93 1, 47 .171 
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Table 7. Predicting Processing Speed 
 
Step Predictor R² Adjusted R² R² ∆ F ∆ df p value 
Model 1        
1 Age, Sex, Education .070 .016 .070 1.3 3, 52 .284 
2 Baseline AS .104 .034 .034 1.953 1, 51 .168 
3 State AS .115 .026 .011 .593 1, 50 .445 
4 Interaction .115 .007 .000 .024 1, 49 .879 
Model 2        
2 Executive Functioning .276 .218 .194 13.397 1, 50 .001** 
3 Baseline AS .284 .211 .008 .577 1, 49 .451 
4 State AS .285 .195 .000 .017 1, 48 .897 
5 Interaction .305 .201 .020 1.373 1, 47 .247 
 
Note. State AS = affect suppression over the past 24 hours; Baseline AS = affect 
suppression over the past 2 weeks; Interaction = State AS x Baseline AS; Executive 



















The current project was a proof of concept study designed to investigate (1) 
whether the depleting effect of AS on executive functioning, observed in experimental 
settings, can be quantified and related to neuropsychological test performance, and, if so, 
(2) whether the depleting effect of AS is specific to executive functioning (as opposed to 
working memory, processing speed, or crystallized intelligence). To those ends, we 
examined the relationship between self-reported burden of state AS and performances on 
standardized tests of executive functioning, working memory, processing speed, and 
crystalized intelligence commonly used in clinical neuropsychological evaluations. 
The first key finding is that individuals with normally low burden of AS exhibit 
considerable executive decrements when their AS burden is high within 24 hours of 
testing.  In contrast, individuals reporting average or high baseline AS exhibited 
executive performances that were apparently unaffected by the burden of state AS.  This 
relationship held after accounting not only for demographics, but also for subclinical 
depression, working memory, and processing speed. The second key finding is that this 
depletion effect appears to be specific to executive functioning, and does not apply to 
performance on measures of working memory, processing speed, or crystallized 
intelligence. To our knowledge, this is the first study to use self-reported burden of AS, 
and first to demonstrate the clinical significance of the depletion phenomenon.  
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These results contribute to evolving conceptualizations of executive functioning, 
showing that AS is a distinctly executive ability, or, conversely, that executive 
functioning is comprised not only of cognitive processes, but also at least some aspects of 
emotion regulation. These results are consistent with previously reported functional and 
neuroanatomic overlap between AS and executive functioning (Bechara et al., 2000; Beer 
& Lombardo, 2007; Goldin et al., 2008; Ochsner & Gross, 2007; Spinella, 2007; Suchy, 
2011). The current study takes these associations a step further by accounting for the 
contributions of component cognitive processes to executive functioning, demonstrating a 
relative lack of association between AS and these component processes. This suggests 
that the depletion effect is indeed related to recruitment of higher order executive 
functioning, as opposed to monopolization of basic attentional resources (Gross, 2007).   
These results also demonstrate the relevance of the depletion effect for clinical 
neuropsychological evaluations. First, we show that situational factors (such as recently 
high burden of AS) account for significant variance in executive functioning 
performance, thereby potentially biasing assessment results for some patients.  
Importantly, among participants who reported their AS burden to be typically low, AS-
related decrements in performance were 2/3 of a scale score standard deviation on 
average.  A performance change of this magnitude is enough to classify participants into 
different performance categories; specifically, while participants with low baseline and 
state AS burden performed in the high average range, participants with high baseline AS 
burden showed average performance.  Such potential bias highlights the need for the 
refinement of methods that would allow us to correct test scores for recent AS burden.  
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Furthermore, we measured the depletion effect in a nonpatient sample of 
individuals without obvious executive deficits (the sample’s mean D-KEFS scale scores 
were fully within the average range, 8-14). It is possible that individuals with executive 
deficits are even more susceptible to depletion than are healthy young individuals.  In 
fact, it is not uncommon for patients and their families to report considerable variability 
in executive abilities on a daily basis, reporting lapses that are not necessarily reflected in 
test results.  Thus, understanding the relationship between AS burden and executive 
functioning in various patient groups may allow for a more accurate representation of 
cognitive skills under optimal conditions as well as offering  a comparison between 
cognition on “good” and “bad” days.  
These results also call into question the extent to which common clinical practices 
of creating a supportive, positive environment during testing eliminates the depletion 
effect. Our results suggest that AS burden anytime within the past 24 hours (i.e., not 
necessarily tied to a particular event during testing) is associated with demonstrably 
poorer executive performance. Therefore, the potentially deleterious effects of 
suppression on executive functioning are not entirely prevented by controlling the 
participant/patient’s immediate testing environment. 
In addition to clinical ramifications, these findings offer a new methodology that 
can be employed in research.  In particular, the B-SERQ appears to offer a viable 
alternative to experimental manipulation of AS burden.  This is particularly relevant for 
examination of the depletion effect among patients for whom affective dysregulation 
tends to coincide with deficits in executive functioning, including many dementing 
illnesses (Ritchie & Lovestone, 2002) and traumatic brain injury (Fann, Burnington, 
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Leonetti, Jaffe, Katon, & Thompson, 2004). However, it may be impossible, impractical, 
or unethical to experimentally manipulate AS burden (which often involves inducing 
unpleasant emotional arousal) in vulnerable patient populations.  In contrast, simply 
assessing naturalistically occurring AS burden via self-report makes it logistically 
possible to examine the depletion effect in a wide range of clinical populations with 
minimal upset to participants. While a number of scales measuring trait affect 
regulation/coping styles are available for use in research and clinical assessments (e.g., 
the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003), the Cognitive Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire (Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001), the Inventory of 
Cognitive Affect Regulation Strategies (Kamholz, Hayes, Carver, Gulliver, & Perlman, 
2006), and the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (Gratz & Roemer, 2004)), we are 
unaware of any currently published scales measuring the clinically relevant burden of 
state AS. Based on our results, the B-SERQ (developed by the researchers for this study) 
demonstrates promise as a new measure of state AS for use in future studies. 
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
The present study has several potential limitations. First, we examined the association 
between AS and executive functioning in a predominantly female (64.3%), White 
(66.1%), college-educated (14 years of education on average) adult sample.  It is possible 
that differences in the observed effect exist based on ethnic, cultural, and even religious 
differences (due to differences in the meaning, effortfulness, acceptability, or frequency 
of AS) that were not examined in this study. Age differences might also exist, such that 
effort associated with AS differs for children and older adults.  Therefore, the 
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generalizability of these results in the general population may be limited. Future studies 
should examine this effect in larger, more ethnically and culturally diverse samples and 
across the lifespan. 
Second, because different sets of items were included in state and baseline AS scores, 
it is possible that these scores captured slightly different constructs (see Tables 1 and 2). 
A greater number of items and greater range of scores contributed to slightly higher 
reliability of baseline AS (α= .811) than state AS (α= .795). Therefore, it is possible that 
baseline AS represents a slightly different construct (e.g., personality traits closely related 
to propensity for AS) than state AS, rather than the same construct over a different time 
period. However, our sample size is inadequate for the purpose of performing statistical 
analyses for construct validity of the B-SERQ. 
Third, these results show that AS predicts executive functioning beyond variance 
accounted for by depressive symptoms in a nondepressed sample. However, it will be 
important to examine the extent to which AS burden impacts executive functioning in 
mood-disordered populations. Given that individuals with mood disorders likely have 
chronically-high AS burden, and severely-depressed individuals exhibit executive 
weaknesses (Wang et al., 2008; Rogers et al., 2004), it is possible that chronic burden of 
AS contributes to these cognitive limitations in this population. 
Finally, all executive functioning tests in our battery are timed, demanding speeded 
performance. However, unlike previous studies, we included separate measures of 
processing speed to account for this component cognitive skill. Future studies may wish 
to include untimed executive functioning measures in order to more directly compare 
executive functioning without processing speed to executive functioning with processing 
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speed. It is at least possible that AS affects performance where the total cognitive load is 
greatest (executive functioning plus processing speed plus working memory demands), 
and not necessarily performance on less demanding (i.e., untimed) planning and 
organization tasks. Speed demands and time limits also contribute to the modest 
reliability of the D-KEFS subtests. Therefore, these results should be replicated and 
examined longitudinally to determine the consistency of the relationship between state 







Aldao, A., Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Schweizer, S. (2010). Emotion-regulation strategies 
across psychopathology: A meta-analytic review. Clinical Psychology Review, 
30(2), 217-237. doi: 10.1016/j.cpr.2009.11.004 
 
Allen, P. A., Grabbe, J., McCarthy, A., Bush, A. H., & Wallace, B. (2008). The early bird 
does not get the worm: Time-of-day effects on college students' basic cognitive 
processing. The American Journal of Psychology, 121(4), 551-564. doi: 
10.2307/20445486 
 
Pearson Clinical Assessments. (2009). Advanced Clinical Solutions for WAIS-IV and 
WMS-IV: Administration and Scoring Manual. Bloomington, MN: Pearson. 
 
Bartolic, E. I., Basso, M. R., Schefft, B. K., Glauser, T., & Titanic-Schefft, M. (1999). 
Effects of experimentally-induced emotional states on frontal lobe cognitive task 
performance. Neuropsychologia, 37(6), 677-683. doi: 10.1016/S0028-
3932(98)00123-7 
 
Baumeister, R. F. (2002a). Ego depletion and self-control failure: An energy model of the 
self's executive function. Self and Identity, 1(2), 129-136. doi: 
10.1080/152988602317319302 
 
Baumeister, R. F. (2002b). Losing control: How & why people fail at self-
regulation/handbook of self-regulation (Book). Journal of Psychiatry & Law, 
30(2), 283.  
 
Baumeister, R. F., & Alquist, J. L. (2009). Is there a downside to good self-control? Self 
and Identity, 8(2-3), 115-130. doi: 10.1080/15298860802501474 
 
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Muraven, M., & Tice, D. M. (1998). Ego depletion: Is 
the active self a limited resource? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
74(5), 1252-1265. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.74.5.1252 
 
Baumeister, R. F., Gailliot, M., DeWall, C. N., & Oaten, M. (2006). Self-Regulation and 
Personality: How Interventions Increase Regulatory Success, and How Depletion 
Moderates the Effects of Traits on Behavior. Journal of Personality, 74(6), 1773-
1801. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.2006.00428.x 
  32 
 
 
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., & Damasio, A. R. (2000). Emotion, decision making and the 
orbitofrontal cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 10(3), 295-307. doi: 
10.1093/cercor/10.3.295 
 
Beck, A. T., Ward, C. H., Mendelson, M., Mock, J., & Erbaugh, J. (1961). An inventory 
for measuring depression. Archives of General Psychiatry, 4, 561-571. doi: 
10.1001/archpsyc.1961.01710120031004 
 
Beer, J. S., & Lombardo, M. V. (2007). Insights into Emotion Regulation from 
Neuropsychology. In J. J. Gross (Ed.), Handbook of emotion regulation (pp. 69-
86). New York, NY US: Guilford Press. 
 
Bennett, C. L., Petros, T. V., Johnson, M., & Ferraro, F. R. (2008). Individual differences 
in the influence of time of day on executive functions. The American Journal of 
Psychology, 121(3), 349-361. doi: 10.2307/20445471 
 
Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S. G., & Aiken, L. S. (2003). Applied multiple 
regression/correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences (3rd ed.). Mahwah, NJ 
US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers. 
 
Delis, D. C., Kramer, J. H., Kaplan, E., & Holdnack, J. (2004). Reliability and validity of 
the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System: An update. Journal of the 
International Neuropsychological Society, 10(2), 301-303. doi: 
10.1017/S1355617704102191 
 
Denollet, J., Martens, E. J., Nyklíček, I., Conraads, V. M., & de Gelder, B. (2008). 
Clinical events in coronary patients who report low distress: Adverse effect of 
repressive coping. Health Psychology, 27(3), 302-308. doi: 10.1037/0278-
6133.27.3.302 
 
Fann, J. R., Burington, B., Leonetti, A., Jaffe, K., Katon, W. J., & Thompson, R. S. 
(2004). Psychiatric illness following traumatic brain injury in an adult health 
maintenance organization population. Archives of General Psychiatry, 61(1), 53-
63. doi: 10.1001/archpsyc.61.1.53 
 
Gailliot, M. T. (2010). The effortful and energy-demanding nature of prosocial behavior. 
In M. Mikulincer & P. R. Shaver (Eds.), Prosocial motives, emotions, and 
behavior: The better angels of our nature (pp. 169-180). Washington, DC US: 
American Psychological Association. 
 
Garnefski, N., Kraaij, V., & Spinhoven, P. (2001). Negative life events, cognitive 
emotion regulation and emotional problems. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 30(8), 1311-1327. doi: 10.1016/s0191-8869(00)00113-6 
 
Gilboa-Schechtman, E., Revelle, W., & Gotlib, I. H. (2000). Stroop interference 
following mood induction: Emotionality, mood congruence and concern 
  33 
 
 
relevance. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 24(5), 491-502. doi: 
10.1023/A:1005517326981 
 
Goldin, P., McRae, K., Ramel, W., & Gross, J. (2008). The neural bases of emotion 
regulation: Reappraisal and suppression of negative emotion. Biological 
Psychiatry, 63(6), 577-586. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2007.05.031 
 
Gratz, K. L., & Roemer, L. (2004). Multidimensional assessment of emotion regulation 
and dysregulation: Development, factor structure, and initial validation of the 
difficulties in emotion regulation scale. Journal of Psychopathology and 
Behavioral Assessment, 26(1), 41-54. doi: 10.1023/b:joba.0000007455.08539.94 
 
Gross, J. J. (1998). Antecedent- and response-focused emotion regulation: Divergent 
consequences for experience, expression, and physiology. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 74(1), 224-237. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.74.1.224 
 
Gross, J. J. (2007). Handbook of emotion regulation. New York, NY US: Guilford Press. 
 
Gross, J. J., & John, O. P. (2003). Individual differences in two emotion regulation 
processes: Implications for affect, relationships, and well-being. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 85(2), 348-362. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.85.2.348 
 
Gross, J. J., & Levenson, R. W. (1993). Emotional suppression: Physiology, self-report, 
and expressive behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64(6), 
970-986. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.64.6.970 
 
Harrison, Y., & Horne, J. A. (2000). The impact of sleep deprivation on decision making: 
A review. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 6(3), 236-249. doi: 
10.1037/1076-898X.6.3.236 
 
Inzlicht, M., & Gutsell, J. N. (2007). Running on empty: Neural signals for self-control 
failure. Psychological Science, 18(11), 933-937. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2007.02004.x 
 
Johns, M., Inzlicht, M., & Schmader, T. (2008). Stereotype threat and executive resource 
depletion: Examining the influence of emotion regulation. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 137(4), 691-705. doi: 10.1037/a0013834 
 
Kamholz, B. W., Hayes, A. M., Carver, C. S., Gulliver, S. B., & Perlman, C. A. (2006). 
Identification and evaluation of cognitive affect-regulation strategies: 
Development of a self-report measure. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 30(2), 
227-262. doi: 10.1007/s10608-006-9013-1 
 
Kraybill, M., Thorgusen, S. R., & Suchy, Y. (2012). The Push-Turn-Taptap task 
outperforms measures of executive functioning in predicting declines in 
  34 
 
 
functionality: Evidence-based approach to test validation. The Clinical 
Neuropsychologist. 
 
Kraybill, M. L., & Suchy, Y. (2011). Executive functioning, motor programming, and 
functional independence: Accounting for variance, people, and time. The Clinical 
Neuropsychologist, 25(2), 210-223. doi: 10.1080/13854046.2010.542489 
 
Maridakis, V., Herring, M. P., & O'Connor, P. J. (2009). Sensitivity to change in 
cognitive performance and mood measures of energy and fatigue in response to 
differing doses of caffeine or breakfast. International Journal of Neuroscience, 
119(7), 975-994. doi: 10.1080/00207450802333995 
 
Maridakis, V., O'Connor, P. J., & Tomporowski, P. D. (2009). Sensitivity to change in 
cognitive performance and mood measures of energy and fatigue in response to 
morning caffeine alone or in combination with carbohydrate. International 
Journal of Neuroscience, 119(8), 1239-1258. doi: 10.1080/00207450802333987 
 
Martin, E. A., & Kerns, J. G. (2011). The influence of positive mood on different aspects 
of cognitive control. Cognition and Emotion, 25(2), 265-279. doi: 
10.1080/02699931.2010.491652 
 
McDermott, L. M., & Ebmeier, K. P. (2009). A meta-analysis of depression severity and 
cognitive function. Journal of Affective Disorders, 119(1-3), 1-8. doi: 
10.1016/j.jad.2009.04.022 
 
Moore, S. A., Zoellner, L. A., & Mollenholt, N. (2008). Are expressive suppression and 
cognitive reappraisal associated with stress-related symptoms? Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 46(9), 993-1000. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2008.05.001 
 
Muraven, M., Tice, D. M., & Baumeister, R. F. (1998). Self-control as a limited resource: 
Regulatory depletion patterns. Journal of Clinical and Experimental 
Neuropsychology, 74(3), 774-789. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.74.3.774 
 
Myers, L. B., Burns, J. W., Derakshan, N., Elfant, E., Eysenck, M. W., & Phipps, S. 
(2008). Current issues in repressive coping and health. In A. Vingerhoets, I. 
Nyklíček & J. Denollet (Eds.), Emotion regulation: Conceptual and clinical 
issues (pp. 69-86). New York, NY US: Springer Science + Business Media. 
 
Oaksford, M., Morris, F., Grainger, B., & Williams, J. M. G. (1996). Mood, reasoning, 
and central executive processes. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 22(2), 476-492. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.22.2.476 
 
Ochsner, K. N., & Gross, J. J. (2007). The neural architecture of emotion regulation. In J. 
J. Gross (Ed.), Handbook of emotion regulation (pp. 87-109). New York, NY US: 
Guilford Press. 
 
  35 
 
 
Ohira, H., Nomura, M., Ichikawa, N., Isowa, T., Iidaka, T., Sato, A.,…Nakajima, Y.J. 
(2006). Association of neural and physiological responses during voluntary 
emotion suppression. NeuroImage, 29, 721-733.  
 
Pocheptsova, A., Amir, O., Dhar, R., & Baumeister, R. F. (2009). Deciding without 
resources: Resource depletion and choice in context. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 46(3), 344-355. doi: 10.1509/jmkr.46.3.344 
 
PsychCorp. (2001). Wechsler Test of Adult Reading. New York: The Psychological 
Corporation. 
 
Richeson, J. A., Trawalter, S., & Shelton, N.J. (2005). African Americans' implicit racial 
attitudes and the depletion of executive function after interracial interactions. 
Social Cognition, 23(4), 336-352. doi: 10.1521/soco.2005.23.4.336 
 
Ritchie, K., & Lovestone, S. (2002). The dementias. The Lancet, 360(9347), 1767-1769. 
doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(02)11667-9 
 
Rogers, M. A., Kasai, K., Koji, M., Fukuda, R., Iwanami, A., Nakagome, K., . . . Kato, N. 
(2004). Executive and prefrontal dysfunction in unipolar depression: A review of 
neuropsychological and imaging evidence. Neuroscience Research, 50(1), 1-11. 
doi: 10.1016/j.neures.2004.05.003 
 
Schmeichel, B. J. (2007). Attention control, memory updating, and emotion regulation 
temporarily reduce the capacity for executive control. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 136(2), 241-255. doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.136.2.241 
 
Schmeichel, B. J., Vohs, K. D., & Baumeister, R. F. (2003). Intellectual performance and 
ego depletion: Role of the self in logical reasoning and other information 
processing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(1), 33-46. doi: 
10.1037/0022-3514.85.1.33 
 
Shamosh, N. A., & Gray, J. R. (2007). The relation between fluid intelligence and self-
regulatory depletion. Cognition and Emotion, 21(8), 1833-1843. doi: 
10.1080/02699930701273658 
 
Spinella, M. (2007). Measuring the executive regulation of emotion with self-rating 
scales in a nonclinical population. Journal of General Psychology, 134(1), 101-
111. doi: 10.3200/genp.134.1.101-111 
 
Stucke, T. S., & Baumeister, R. F. (2006). Ego depletion and aggressive behavior: Is the 
inhibition of aggression a limited resource? European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 36(1), 1-13. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.285 
 
Stuss, D. T., Picton, T. W., & Alexander, M. P. (2001). Consciousness, self-awareness, 
and the frontal lobes. In S. P. Salloway, P. F. Malloy & J. D. Duffy (Eds.), The 
  36 
 
 
frontal lobes and neuropsychiatric illness (pp. 101-109). Arlington, VA US: 
American Psychiatric Publishing, Inc. 
 
Suchy, Y. (2011). Clinical neuropsychology of emotion. New York, NY: The Guilford 
Press. 
 
Wang, L., LaBar, K. S., Smoski, M., Rosenthal, M. Z., Dolcos, F., Lynch, T. R., . . . 
McCarthy, G. (2008). Prefrontal mechanisms for executive control over emotional 
distraction are altered in major depression. Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging, 
163(2), 143-155. doi: 10.1016/j.pscychresns.2007.10.004 
 
Wechsler, D. (1997a). Wechsler adult intelligence scale, third edition. San Antonio, TX: 
The Psychological Corporation. 
 
Williams, P. G., Suchy, Y., & Kraybill, M. L. (2010). Five-factor model personality traits 
and executive functioning among older adults. Journal of Research in 
Personality, 44(4), 485-491. doi: 10.1016/j.jrp.2010.06.002 
